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EURO-BASHING AS GOOD SPORT
Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2004, 266pp. $19.95

Is the alliance between the United States
and the European community of nations broken beyond repair? Brookings
Institution scholars Philip H. Gordon
and Jeremy Shapiro definitively address
the most fundamental and perplexing
question continuing to face transatlantic relations. The authors, both products of the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies and
presently in residence at Brookings in
the Foreign Policy Studies Program,
undertake a disciplined, critical analysis
of whether the special relationship between nations is worth preserving. The
book, in essence, represents a magnum
opus regarding the ongoing question of
shared values and solidarity in the U.S.European alliance. Gordon and Shapiro
effectively present valuable counterpoints to prominent neoconservative
viewpoints marginalizing the influence
and utility of Europe—particularly
“Old Europe.” This volume argues that
the differences between the European
and American viewpoints on security,
particularly handling the rise of radical
Islam, are more complex than Robert
Kagan’s “Americans are from Mars,
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Europeans are from Venus” analogy.
Gordon and Shapiro’s ultimate conclusion is that strategic partners who share
so much cultural identity with the
United States, and who have had the
courage to invoke for the first time in
the alliance’s fifty-two-year history their
mutual defense clause in the wake of
the 11 September attacks, should not be
cast aside in the interest of short-term
political expediency and of pandering
to demographic elements who regard
Euro-bashing as good sport. Despite the
posturing, tough talk, and emotionalism
swirling around the continued debate
on the viability of the most successful
and functional international alliance in
history, America needs its European allies and NATO as much as they need
America.
Although Gordon and Shapiro scrutinize the historic alliance of NATO and
its relevance in light of the diminished
threat from the East, they are also talking about something larger than NATO
and its internal imperfections and
inefficiencies and the synergy of its
membership. They explore the real,
substantial fissures in the transatlantic
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alliance generally and the ascendancy of
a new paradigm of political equality between the world’s only remaining superpower and the interstate economic and
political entity of Europe. Disagreement
between the United States and the European powers is nothing new. As examples, the authors cite the 1956 Suez
crisis, disharmony over U.S. policy in
Vietnam (as the United States arguably
attempted to finish what the French
started in Indochina), substantive debates over the placement of Minuteman
nuclear missiles in Germany during the
height of the Cold War, and internal
rifts over policy in the Balkans. They
also observe that French leadership of
the international intransigence toward
U.S. policy on Iraq led some in the U.S.
government and American society in
general to exaggerate (and oversimplify)
perceived French ingratitude for American contributions to their own preservation of sovereignty—–twice in the
same century—and German ungratefulness for the substantial postwar reconstruction that brought West Germany
quickly back into the community of nations. The authors rightly observe that
the U.S.-European rift demonstrates
less about European courage and willingness to take a hard line against Iraq
than about the European community’s
demand to at long last be truly equal
partners in the alliance.
Gordon and Shapiro note that the familiar refrain, “the mission should determine the coalition,” is far more
controversial than it sounds: while a nation such as the United States should,
of course, put its own national security
interests first, is there a long view on
cooperative strategy that trumps shortterm coalition building? Allies at War
represents a road map for “how to get
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there from here.” The authors hypothesize that given more time for diplomacy
and a meaningful chance for Iraq to
avoid war, France would have eventually voted for war. Germany, emboldened by the French example of standing
down the Americans, would have probably followed suit, lessening Russian
and Chinese resolve to block the war in
the UN Security Council. The American
diplomatic strategy, born perhaps of
arrogance, intemperance, or a lack of
understanding of the value of international approval or acquiescence to the
principle of regime change in Iraq,
placed the rest of the world on the
American time line, which reflected eagerness to gain approval before the onset of summer temperatures in Iraq,
which in turn diminish combat effectiveness. The diplomatic effort was
driven by a single factor—because the
United States had moved a hundred
thousand troops and tens of thousands
of tons of gear and materiel halfway
around the world, war had to happen in
March and could not wait until October. For many Europeans, America’s
“enough is enough” policy represented
a fait accompli. The U.S. challenge was
to legitimize a decision that had been
made long before—to invade Iraq and
topple the Baathist government.
The detailed authoritative account of
the diplomatic effort is alone worth the
investment in this book. The effort was
a crusade that ultimately failed to
achieve its prewar goal to unite Europe
and add support, if not membership, to
the ad hoc coalition. Concerning the
run-up to war, and in its aftermath, the
question lingers—did the war irreparably harm the relationship between
NATO, the United States and Europe?
Is the alienation permanent? If not,
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what can and should be done to repair
the damage? Should we care?
Allies at War highlights convincingly
that the egotistical, black-and-white,
good vs. “axis of evil” juxtaposition of
parties in the conflict seemingly made it
easy, even necessary, for Americans to
demand that the Europeans choose
sides: “You’re either with us or against
us.” The Europeans, by contrast, found
room for a third position. They would
be willing to hold Iraq accountable,
through military action if necessary, but
only after diplomacy had been exhausted,
not merely attempted. Perhaps, in light
of the conflict that followed, the French
and German position was not unreasonable—that the fact that Iraq had
been in technical noncompliance with a
litany of UN Security Council resolutions for a decade or more paled in
comparison to their interest in demanding equal partnership and real,
meaningful consultation between the
United States and European powers.
The authors identify three key factors
underlying French leadership of the
European revolution: that removing
Saddam Hussein from power could
prove to be a strategic mistake; the desire to deny the United States a “blank
check” for the use of force in pursuit of
narrow national interests; and the establishment of French and German
leadership of the European Union
(EU). Yet at least one other factor does
not obtain sufficient treatment in this
book—the effect that French, German,
and other European national economic
considerations had upon the decision to
oppose U.S. military intervention in
Iraq. Indeed, eighteen months after the
initiation of hostilities, Germany, France,
and Russia were finally convinced by
U.S. diplomats to forgive up to 80
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percent of Iraq’s multibillion dollar
debt to the nineteen-nation “Paris
club” to promote Iraqi reconstruction
efforts. Moreover, a recent report by
CIA investigator Charles Duelfer revealed substantial economic interests
personally held by influential French
businessmen and politicians—interests
tied to the UN oil-for-food program.
Whether economic considerations materially affected the Franco-German
position remains to be seen; ultimately,
however, the underlying nature of
French and German prewar obstinacy
would not change Gordon and
Shapiro’s ultimate conclusions that the
U.S.-European alliance should be here
to stay and that U.S. investment in repairing continental relations would be
beneficial to both sides of the ocean.
Current “damn the torpedoes”
groupthink is not sustainable in the interest of long-term security, and the
benefit of gaining European and international legitimacy and resources is
worth the cost in efficiency and selfdetermination. The security of liberal
democracies from the common threat
of radical Islamic terrorism demands
solidarity, consultation, and compromise, not more brinksmanship and
alienation. The war on terror could
last forty-eight years, not forty-eight
months, and even the military behemoth United States cannot go it alone
in a fight this long, extensive, and
wide-ranging.
Overall, Gordon and Shapiro’s argument that the alliance is worth protecting and preserving is sound. This is a
book for security professionals serious
about examining the future of U.S. relations with the group of well resourced
and well respected nations that have
been longest our steadfast friends,
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rather than indulging in oversimplified
truisms regarding French and German
national courage and gratitude for American participation in the world wars, the
Marshall Plan, and the Cold War.
ROB BRACKNELL

Major, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe
Staff Judge Advocate, USA,
Al Anbar Province, Iraq

Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency
on Imported Petroleum. New York: Henry Holt,
2004. 265 pp. $25

In Blood and Oil, Professor Michael
Klare of Hampshire College offers an
important critique of U.S. national security policy, one that should be read
by American security professionals. In
brief, he argues that U.S. foreign and
military policy has been increasingly
driven by the need to ensure reliable access to foreign oil, especially in the
Middle East, and that as American foreign oil dependence continues to grow,
U.S. forces will increasingly find themselves fighting to defend oil-producing
regions and supply routes.
An engaging writer, Klare develops his
thesis as follows. After documenting
the substantial and growing U.S. dependence on foreign oil and the problems it
has created, Klare describes the increasing involvement of the United States in
the Middle East since World War II,
particularly its close ties with Saudi
Arabia, and the negative consequences
of this involvement for American security. The next two chapters detail the
latest phase of this unfolding story; they
analyze the energy strategy adopted by
the Bush administration in 2001,
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pointing out how it has only reinforced
U.S. dependence on foreign oil, especially from the Persian Gulf, and they
describe the administration’s policies
toward the region. A fifth chapter discusses the prospects for diversifying
foreign oil supplies, concluding that
this approach offers little hope of reducing U.S. reliance on the Gulf even
though it would increase the chances of
American entanglement in conflicts
elsewhere, while a sixth describes how
U.S. oil dependence may increasingly
bring this country into conflict with
Russia and China. The final chapter
summarizes the costs of oil dependence.
It all too briefly sets forth an alternative
national energy strategy of “autonomy
and integrity,” which emphasizes detaching our pursuit of energy from security commitments to foreign
governments, reducing oil consumption, and hastening the development of
alternative energy sources.
Overall, Klare performs a valuable public service by shining a spotlight on the
national security consequences of U.S.
foreign oil dependence, consequences
that have often gone underappreciated.
A central theme is how American leaders have chosen to “securitize” oil—that
is, “to cast its continued availability as a
matter of ‘national security,’ and thus
something that can be safeguarded
through the use of military force.” The
book is very well documented, with
forty-five pages of notes, including references to a number of primary sources.
Some of Klare’s claims may seem shrill
or speculative, in part because they are
so rarely voiced, but they nevertheless
bear careful consideration. Perhaps
most controversial will be his description of the current U.S. policy toward
the Gulf. “In the months before and
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